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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
GORDON RAY HAM 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellant Gordon Ray Ham ("Mr. Ham") brings this appeal from 
the decision of the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (f) and Utah R. Crim P. 26(2) (a) (1994). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. ISSUES FOR REVIEW (R. 55-60) 
The issues presented on this appeal are the following: 
1. Did the lower court err when it determined state and 
federal constitutional rights were not violated when agents of the 
Utah Department of Corrections searched Mr. Hamfs residence without 
the requisite "reasonable suspicion" that Mr. Ham had violated or 
was currently violating a condition of his probation or any state, 
local, or federal law. 
2. Did the lower court err when it determined agents were 
authorized by Mr. Ham's probation agreement to search his 
refrigerator and, by implication, the separate freezer; and does 
any alleged probation agreement supersede a probationer's state and 
federal constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures. 
3. Did the lower court err when it determined that Mr. Ham 
voluntarily consented to the search of his refrigerator, analyzed 
under state and federal constitutional standards. 
4. Did the lower court err when it determined that any 
contraband found downstairs was not illegally seized because 
Mr.Ham, after being placed under arrest, was not advised of his 
rights per Miranda before the officers interrogated him, which led 
to officers obtaining incriminating statements and evidence. 
B. Standards of Review 
1. Utah Law 
The standard of review under Utah law is a correction of error 
standard and the trial court's factual findings will not be set 
aside unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Harmon, 854 P.2d 
1037, 1040 (Utah App. 1993) (citing State v. Thurman, 846 P. 2d 
1256, 1271 (Utah 1993). 
2. Federal Law 
Pursuant to the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Thurman, the 
same standard of review is applied to federal law. See 846 P.2d at 
1266-67 ("[T]he standard of review is a question to be determined 
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by the law of the forum performing the appellate review."). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
U.S. CONST, amend. IV. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
UTAH CONST, art. I, § 1 4 . 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
person or thing to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(a) Nature of the Case. 
This appeal is from entry of judgment and conviction by the 
Honorable David S. Young, Judge of the Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah. 
(b) Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
On or about October 19, 1994, Mr. Ham, a probationer, was 
charged with Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance With 
Intent to Distribute, a Second Degree Felony, and Unlawful 
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Third Degree Felony. The 
case was assigned to Judge David S. Young and on or about the 10th 
day of November, 1994, Mr. Ham filed a Motion To Suppress Evidence 
seized on October 13, 1994, from Mr. Ham's residence. Seven days 
later, on the 17th day of November, 1994, an evidentiary hearing on 
Mr. Ham's suppression motion was held. Mr. Ham's motion was denied 
3 
in its entirety on or about the 22nd day of November, 1994. 
As a result of Judge Young1s November 22nd ruling, an 
agreement was reached whereby the State would drop the Third Degree 
Felony charge in exchange for Mr. Ham's entry of a conditional plea 
of guilty to the Second Degree Felony. On December 12, 1994, 
pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), Mr. Ham 
entered a Conditional-Change-Of-Plea to one count of Unlawful 
Possession of a Controlled Substance With Intent to Distribute, a 
Second Degree Felony. 
Following completion of a presentence report, Mr. Ham was 
sentenced on January 23, 1995, to a term of one to fifteen years at 
the Utah State Prison and was taken away forthwith. Mr. Ham filed 
his Notice of Appeal on that same day, January 23, 1995. On or 
about the 17th day of February, 1995, Mr. Ham filed an Application 
For Issuance Of A Certificate Of Probable Cause which, following a 
hearing on the Application, was granted by Judge David S. Young on 
the 9th day of March, 1995, and Mr. Ham was ordered released from 
the Utah State Prison pending the current appeal. 
However, as a result of Mr. Ham's status as a probationer at 
the time of the events giving rise to the charges addressed in 
Judge Young's court, Mr. Ham's probation was revoked by the 
Honorable Anne M. Stirba, District Court Judge, and Mr. Ham remains 
incarcerated at the Utah State Prison. Thus far, Mr. Ham has 
decided against an appeal of Judge Stirba1s revocation ruling, 
although this ruling is directly and equally applicable to the 
issues being raised in the current appeal. 
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(c) Statement of Material Facts, 
On or about the 8th day of March, 1993, Mr. Ham entered a plea 
of guilty to two counts of Sexual Assault, both Third Degree 
Felonies, and was sentenced to three years probation under the 
supervision of the Adult Probation & Parole division of the Utah 
Department of Corrections. Mr. Ham was on probation at the time 
events giving rise to the underlying charges in this matter 
occurred. 
On October 13, 1994, at approximately 3:50 p.m, Agents Scott 
A. McCullough and Craig Hillam, probation officers for the Utah 
Department of Corrections (UDC) , went to 8625 South 150 West, 
Midvale, Utah, Mr. Ham's residence, to conduct a "routine home 
visit." When the agents arrived at Mr. Ham!s residence, they were 
greeted at the door by a guest of Mr. Ham's, who notified Mr. Ham 
that he had company. 
Mr. Ham came up from the downstairs area of his residence and 
greeted the agents, who by this time were standing just inside the 
front door of his residence. Agents McCullough and Hillam then 
held a very brief conversation with Mr. Ham regarding how he was 
doing with his therapy and other things in general. At some point 
during this brief conversation, Agent McCullough told Mr. Ham that 
he was going to do an alcohol check and that he "needed" to look in 
Mr. Ham's refrigerator. At no point in time did Agent McCullough 
or Agent Hillam specifically ask Mr. Ham for his permission to look 
in the refrigerator, or for that matter, any other area of the 
residence. 
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Based upon Agent McCullough1s authoritative statement that he 
was going to look in the refrigerator, Mr. Ham walked into the 
kitchen area, opened the refrigerator door and offered each of the 
agents a soda pop. Agent McCullough followed Mr. Ham into the 
kitchen area and proceeded to examine the contents of the 
refrigerator. Agent Hillam then walked into another area of Mr. 
Ham's kitchen. Mr. Ham returned to the living room area of his 
residence while Agent McCullough was searching the refrigerator. 
Some three to four feet away from the refrigerator was a 
closed, free-standing and entirely separate freezer unit. The 
freezer was located next to a wall that was perpendicular to the 
refrigerator's location. Without making a request or comment of 
any kind, Agent Hillam opened the closed freezer unit and began a 
thorough examination of its contents. During this search, Agent 
Hillam located two nearly empty bottles of alcoholic beverages 
commonly used as mixers. 
Agent Hillam poured the contents of these bottles down the 
sink, and Agent McCullough informed Mr. Ham the liquor was a 
violation of his probation. Agent McCullough then informed Mr. Ham 
that they were going to examine the rest of Mr. Ham's residence and 
told Mr. Ham to accompany them while they continued the search. 
The agents then began a cursory search of the up-stairs portion of 
Mr. Ham's residence. Upon finding no other incriminating evidence, 
the agents began a more intensive search and discovered a couple of 
empty beer cans and some pornographic tapes. The agents then 
directed Mr. Ham to accompany them downstairs where they continued 
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their search of his residence. 
Once downstairs, Mr. Ham instructed the agents on how to turn 
on the lights whereupon Agent McCullough located a cooler, opened 
it, and discovered approximately 14 cans of beer on ice. Agent 
Hillam went to an adjacent area of the basement, which was a type 
of storage area, and asked Mr. Ham how to operate the lights in 
that area. Mr. Ham informed Agent Hillam how to turn on the light; 
thereafter, Agent Hillam observed a large framed mirror with a 
white powdery substance on it. He also observed a razor blade, 
straw, various miscellaneous items, and a plastic bag containing a 
quantity of pills. 
Agent Hillam returned to the area where Mr. Ham was located 
and placed him under arrest, although neither Agent Hillam nor 
Agent McCullough advised Mr. Ham of his rights per Miranda. 
Thereafter, without his Miranda rights having been given, Agent 
Hillam and Agent McCullough began interrogating Mr. Ham about 
whether there was anything else in the basement they should know 
about. In response, Mr. Ham disclosed to the agents that there was 
some cocaine in a large locked box under the stairs. He also 
informed them that the key to the lock was in his pocket. Unable 
to retrieve the key from his own pocket, because his hands were 
cuffed, one of the agents retrieved the key and unlocked the large 
box whereupon Agent McCullough found the additional cocaine Mr. Ham 
had identified. 
The agents then told Mr. Ham he had better tell them about 
anything else that may be in the basement. Mr. Ham responded by 
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telling the agents that they could find a small quantity of 
mushrooms in a cup on one of the shelves in the basement. The 
agents located the mushrooms where Mr. Ham said they would be. 
Thereafter, one of the agents contacted the Midvale Police 
Department to request back-up. It was during this wait, and after 
incriminating statements were made and evidence discovered, that 
Agent Hillam finally advised Mr. Ham of his rights per Miranda. 
Agent McCullough then telephoned Debbie Kemp, another agent of 
UDC and Mr. Ham's recently assigned probation agent. Agent 
McCullough requested that Agent Kemp bring a field evidence kit to 
the scene and, upon Agent Kemp's arrival, the substances located 
during the search of Mr. Ham's residence were tested. After the 
testing was concluded, Mr. Ham was transported to the Salt Lake 
County Jail facility. Mr. Ham is presently incarcerated at the 
Utah State Prison. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
An individual does not forfeit all constitutional rights to be 
free from unreasonable searches and seizures simply because that 
individual happens to be on probation. Although diminished, a 
probationer retains constitutional protections under the 4th 
amendment to the U.S. Constitution and under Article I, section 14 
of the Utah Constitution. 
As advanced by both state and federal interpretation, this 
diminished protection still requires at least a "reasonable 
suspicion" of wrongdoing before a warrantless and non-consensual 
search of a probationer's property can be conducted. In the 
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present case, there was no suspicion of any type that Mr. Ham was 
doing anything inappropriate, there was no warrant to conduct a 
search, and Mr. Ham did not consent to a search of his residence. 
The search of Mr. Ham's residence was therefore constitutionally 
inappropriate. 
Without a warrant or "reasonable suspicion" of illegal 
conduct, even Corrections agents are required to procure the 
knowing, voluntary and unambiguous consent of a probationer before 
they conduct a search of the probationer's private property. At 
the very minimum, this requires a direct and unambiguous request 
for permission to conduct a search and an equally direct and 
unambiguous affirmative response to the search request. In the 
present case, Mr. Ham was never asked if a search of his residence 
could be conducted and Mr. Ham never told agents they could search 
his residence; at best, Mr. Ham merely acquiesced in the 
authoritative and coercive conduct of the agents. Failure to even 
attempt to procure Mr. Ham's consent for their search made the 
agent's conduct illegal under both state and federal constitutions. 
Even if Mr. Ham's conduct could be interpreted as consent for 
the agents to look in the refrigerator, which is the only area 
specifically addressed by the agents, a constitutionally valid 
search is only valid to the extent specifically identified as the 
area and/or item to be searched. When the agents went beyond the 
refrigerator in the course of their search, they exceeded the scope 
of any alleged consent to the search and were therefore violating 
Mr. Ham's right to be free from unwarranted intrusions into his 
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privacy. 
It was only as a result of the illegal search of Mr. Ham's 
freezer that agents began a more thorough search of his residence 
and all further evidence gathered, whether physical or verbal, were 
discovered as a direct result of the agents' exploitation of the 
prior illegality. Without the appropriate warrant, "reasonable 
suspicion" or consent, all evidence gathered at Mr. Ham's residence 
on October 13, 1994, should have been suppressed as "fruits of the 
poisonous tree." 
Finally, advising an arrested individual of their rights per 
Miranda after interrogation and the accumulation of evidence cannot 
dissipate the taint of the initial illegality. In the present 
case, Mr. Ham's residence was unlawfully searched, Mr. Ham was 
arrested, interrogated, and additional searches were conducted, and 
only after the evidence had been gathered was Mr. Ham provided 
notice of his rights per Miranda. Agents of the Department of 
Corrections are trained in search and seizure areas of the law and 
they are just as accountable to the constitutional protections of 
our society as are police officers. 
In the present case, agents of the Department of Corrections 
unilaterally determined their authority was superior to Mr. Ham's 
constitutional protections. That was an unlawful and totally 
inappropriate determination on the agents' part and must be 
appropriately addressed. This Court must reverse the decision of 
the lower court and reiterate to the Department of Corrections that 
even they are subject to the constitution; probationers do retain 
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constitutional rights that must be protected, not abridged. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE AGENTS LACKED A REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT MR. HAM WAS 
VIOLATING THE TERMS OF HIS PROBATION, RENDERING THE NON-
CONSENSUAL SEARCH OF HIS RESIDENCE ILLEGAL. 
In the landmark case of State v. Velasquez, 672 P. 2d 1254 
(Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court specifically addressed and 
affirmed the rights of a parolee to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures under the fourth amendment.1 In Velasquez, 
a parolee was suspected of selling drugs, based on an informant's 
tip and the fact that the parolee had no apparent means of 
legitimate income. Based on this information, parole officers 
executed a warrantless search of the parolee's residence, finding 
incriminating evidence against Velasquez, the parolee's room-mate, 
who also happened to be on parole. 
Velasquez moved the Court to suppress the evidence seized in 
the warrantless search and the lower court declined, finding that 
the agents performing the search had a reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity or a parole violation. 672 P.2d at 1261 n.6. 
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed that the lower court had applied 
the correct standard, stating "[t]hus, although a warrant based on 
probable cause is not generally required, a parole officer must 
have reasonable grounds for investigating whether a parolee has 
violated the terms of his parole or committed a crime." 672 P.2d 
at 1260 (emphasis added). The Court further concluded that the 
1
 See also. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987). 
(The Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches 
applies to probationers). 
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parole officers possessed articulable facts giving rise to a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Id. at 1262. 
While Velasquez treats searches upon parolees, the Court noted 
that "[i]n determining whether the constitutional protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures has been violated, some 
courts have held that the rights of parolees and probationers are 
legally indistinguishable." Id. at 1258 n.2. Then, in State v. 
Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 209-10 (Utah App. 1991), this Court adopted 
the "reasonable suspicion" standard in the probation context. 
Therefore, the "reasonable suspicion" standard as set forth in 
Velasquez is indeed applicable to probationers as well as parolees. 
In the present case, Mr. Ham was on probation at the time of 
the agents search. Mr. Ham had signed a probation agreement 
entitling "an agent of the Department of Corrections to search 
[his] person, residence, vehicle or any other property under [his] 
control, without a warrant, any time day or night, upon reasonable 
suspicion as ascertained by an agent of the Department of 
Corrections to ensure compliance with the conditions of 
probation."2 Thus, even Mr. Ham's Probation Agreement sets forth 
Mr. Ham's right to be free from searches that are not based at 
least upon a reasonable suspicion of a violation of the "conditions 
of probation." Id.3 
2
 Clause 8 of Mr. Ham's Probation Agreement. (See Addendum 
#2) 
3
 Velasquez further affirms that the probation agreement 
cannot constitute a waiver of constitutional rights but "merely 
parallels, by way of confirmation, the right of the parole officer 
. . . to conduct searches rationally and substantially related to 
12 
The reasonable suspicion requirement has been elucidated as 
follows: 
Less stringent a standard than probable cause, reasonable 
.suspicion requires no more than that the authority acting 
be able to point to specific and articulabel facts that, 
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, 
reasonably warrant a belief in the conclusion mooted--in 
this instance, that a condition of parole has been or is 
being violated. 
Velasquez, 672 P.2d at 1260 n.5. Therefore, in the present case, 
Agents McCullough and Hillam were not authorized to search any 
portion of Mr. Ham's residence unless they are able to "point to 
specific and articulable facts" warranting a belief that Mr. Ham 
was violating his probation. However, at the time the agents began. 
their search, they lacked any suspicious facts or circumstances 
entitling them to examine anything but the "plain view" area of Mr. 
Ham's residence. (R.119, 139). 
When the agents first arrived in the home, they stated their 
intent to "look in the fridge for alcohol." (R.123). Although this 
demand was advanced as an official duty, the agents were not 
authorized by the Probation Agreement to conduct alcohol checks 
without reasonable suspicion of at least some form of illegal 
activity on Mr. Ham's part.4 From the moment the Agents notified 
Mr. Ham they were going to search his residence, as opposed to 
requesting permission to search, the Agents were conducting an 
illegal invasion of Mr. Ham's privacy and the fruits of their 
the performance of his duty." 672 P. 2d at 1260, n.4 (quoting 
People v. Huntley, 371 N.E. 2d 794 (1977) . 
4
 And, even if it did, the Constitution would prohibit such 
a practice. See e.g., Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1260 n.4. 
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illegal activity should have been suppressed by the lower court. 
II. THE AGENTS DID NOT OBTAIN OR EVEN SEEK MR. HAM'S CONSENT 
TO SEARCH HIS REFRIGERATOR, FREEZER, OR ANY OTHER PORTION 
OF MR. HAM'S RESIDENCE. 
A search premised on voluntary consent is one of the 
exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 
See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). 
Under Utah law, it is the State's burden to prove consent and it 
must "present proof that consent to search was knowingly and 
voluntarily granted." State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 1297 (Utah 
App. 1991) . Additionally, under federal law, "the voluntariness of 
consent must be determined from the totality of the circumstances, 
and the government bears the burden of proof on the issue." United 
States v. Iribe, 11 F.3d 1553, 1557 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting 
United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548 (10th Cir. 1993)). 
A. The State Failed To Establish Constitutionally Valid Consent 
Was Given By Mr. Ham To Search Any Portion Of His Residence. 
In the present case, the State failed to prove that Mr. Ham 
"knowingly and voluntarily" consented to any search of his 
residence. The standard Utah has adopted for determining the 
"voluntariness" of consent is as follows: 
In order for consent to be voluntary, (1) there must be 
clear and positive testimony that the consent was 
unequivocal, specific, and freely and intelligently 
given; (2) the government must prove consent was given 
without duress or coercion, express or implied; (3) the 
court must indulge every reasonable presumption against 
the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and there 
must be convincing evidence that such rights were waived. 
State v. Harmon, 854 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah App. 1993) . (Citing 
State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah App. 1990), afffd, 853 P.2d 
14 
898 (1993)). Similarly, under federal standards "the government 
must show that there was no duress or coercion, express or implied, 
that the consent was unequivocal and specific, and that it was 
freely and intelligently given." Iribe, 11 F.3d at 1557. Neither 
the Utah standards or the federal standards were met in the present 
case. 
During direct examination, Agent Scott McCullough testified as 
follows: 
* * * 
Q. How did he respond to your statement that you needed to 
go in the refrigerator for alcohol? 
A. Did not respond. I do not remember any particular 
conversation, exactly what was said, that he did not have 
any objection, and I believe he said go ahead, but I do 
not recall specifically. 
(R.123-24). (Emphasis added). 
* * * 
Q. Did he make any verbal response at all to you when you 
told him you needed to look in the refrigerator? 
A. I do not recall a specific response. Mr. Ham was fully 
cooperative during the entire time. 
Q. I want you to focus on this particular point in time. 
A. I do not remember particularly what was said, no, but 
there--! know that there was nothing negatively to us 
looking in the fridge. 
(R.124-25). (Emphasis added). 
Clearly, Agent McCullough's testimony, i.e., "I do not 
remember any particular conversation," and "I believe he said go 
ahead, but I do not recall specifically, " does not satisfy the 
State's burden. This is because "there must be clear and positive 
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and intejiigen^i/ given," Harmon, u -jn x . < i i . pee also, 
Irib^ il r \-> • * resent case, the testimony s not 
c 1 • -.1 • r • * * . •. I < - v | e c l 
consent. 
In additici A - * McCullouah* • *esti*non\ ,_hat -\ 
recall ' : 
what was oaid, "! umo , *. .,.*. .* :< wa^ iu'viiing negatively ;.o a:-, 
looking ridge" likewise does not satisf. i l\^ State's 
bi :u: 
that . .. consent v*.*& anequivutdi, specii ic, du - ' rtrei ana 
intelligently given. *-JJ ; State f ai ! - "arry its 
b *r^< 
const a tuti < • . • : gi.! See, State v. Carter, •* . A--I -i • 
(Utah App. 1°r 
against waiver '/I rundamentai const, IL-..* lonai rights,1' tftip 
Court must tir - • ^r -i • n« * consent • • t-h^ search of *"he 
r ^  f y *" ., , /•-
testimony tc support - * waiver »i legation The testimony shows 
that the agents did not. ask for ;*: i *. f -^'^'VP >4t ~^m>o 
C : ". .. • i--. 
search ^ . htj i reeze .izi~z ertai* !y, the State cannot 
take mere compli^i^ probationer ^r^hat^r: ^ff^^r's 
£ v • . - -.  . *"n 
the probationer's clear, voluntary and unequ ivocal consent to the 
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search. The initial search of Mr. Ham's residence was 
unconstitutionally performed, and the subsequent "more thorough" 
search remains likewise unconstitutional. 
B. If Consent Was Given, The Consent Was Specifically For The 
Refrigerator And Any Extension Of The Search Went Beyond The 
Scope Of The Consent. 
If we assume, for arguments' sake, that consent to search Mr. 
Ham's refrigerator was given, there remains an issue regarding the 
scope of the search which must be addressed. With respect to the 
scope of consent, the Utah Supreme Court stated that "[e]ven when 
a constitutionally valid consent is given, the scope of the ensuing 
search must be limited to the scope of the consent, and police 
activity that exceeds the scope of the consent violates the Fourth 
Amendment." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1218 (Utah 1993) (citing 
Florida v. Jimeno, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 1803-04 (1991)). "The scope of 
the search is generally defined by its expressed object." Jimeno, 
111 S. Ct. at 1804 (emphasis added). 
The testimony shows that there was never a request or 
discussion regarding a "need" to look in the adjacent freezer and 
no consent was ever given by Mr. Ham for the search of the freezer. 
(R.125) . Assuming for the purposes of this discussion that Mr. Ham 
arguably consented to the search of the refrigerator, there is no 
"clear and positive testimony that the consent was unequivocal, 
specific, and freely and intelligently given" with respect to the 
freezer. Even assuming that there was consent to search the 
refrigerator, "the scope of the ensuing search must be limited to 
the scope of the consent [i.e., the refrigerator] ." Dunn, 850 P. 2d 
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a • . 
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III. EXCLUDING THE FRUITS OF THE ILLEGAL SEARCH CONDUCTED BY THE 
PROBATION OFFICERS IN THE PRESENT CASE IS THE ONLY APPROPRIATE 
AND EFFECTIVE MEANS OF DETERRING FUTURE VIOLATIONS ~>~ THTS 
SAME NATURE. 
The exclusionary r-. . s "prime purpose is t-o deter future 
i - awful police c >ndi. :t and thereby effeccuave the auarantee -f the 
Fourth Amendment -ITI--:'"1- rrrvrr'.Mr search i . _iit-.^  
States v. Calandra, u.pose is rc 
deter • t compel reupec? t .i t,.1 • constitutional guaranty -^; * 
only effectively -"" ! Vr \ - " " 
d^sre^ai, ^ " - Calandra Coui; » . _*,
 0^«t^. 
As with any remedial device, the application of the rule 
has been restricted to those areas where its remedial 
objectives are thought most efficaciously served. The 
balancing process implicit in this approach is expressed 
t-he contours of the standing requirement. Thus, 
iiiuing to invoke the exclusionary rule has "been 
confined to situations where the Government seeks to use 
such evidence to incriminate the victim of the -ml awful 
search. [Citations omitted]. This standing rule is 
premised on a recognition that the need for deterrence 
and hence the rationale for excluding the evidence are 
strongest where the Government's unlawful conduct would 
result in imposition of a criminal sanction of the victim 
of the search. 
Citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206# 217 (1960) 
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414 U.S. at 348. 
The officers who searched Mr. Ham's residence on October 13, 
1994, apparently had no incentive to recognize Mr. Ham's 
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and they 
therefore disregarded Mr. Ham's rights. The only "effectively 
available way" to deter similar transgressions in the future is to 
exclude such illegally obtained evidence when it is gathered. The 
exclusionary rule was adopted to realize the Fourth Amendment right 
of all citizens "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . " Under 
this rule, evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
cannot be used in a proceeding against the victim of the illegal 
search and seizure. United States v. Winsett. 518 F.2d 51, 53 (9th 
Cir. 1975) .6 Even Mr. Ham, a probationer, has Fourth Amendment 
rights to be free from unwarranted intrusions into his privacy, 
especially in his own home.7 
Agents McCullough and Hillam of the Utah Department of 
Corrections utilized improper techniques to obtain authority to 
search Mr. Ham's residence, techniques that are in direct 
contravention to federal and state constitutional search and 
seizure procedural safeguards. The agents entered Mr. Ham's 
residence announcing and embracing an authority that Probation 
Officers simply do not posses. In light of the experience levels 
6
 See e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); 
Mapp v. Ohio. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
7
 See, Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987); State v. 
Velasquez. 672 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1983). 
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of these agents, iu it* xeaaonajjle to presume each knew that to 
conduct a legal search of any part ^ Mv~ u qmto residence, the 
agents were required to possess a "reasonable susi/J rioi." i h.»i ' 
Ham wa: -* » 
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Inasmuch as the agents were at Mr. Ham': residence to conduct 
what thev r°f-
requisite !':cabOiiabx* ouspiciuii, ac subduquciil oedich oi any part 
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SPS *: 
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Certainly there :F rationale, under either state federal 
broadei J , ocopt- : i. .:. area specifically identified by tne 
probation officers., 1
 :e. . r :,^  contp^p ^f t-h^  refrigerator. 
B -
from and unrelated \ o tn*. 1 ef r lgeratoi , ; 1 which the a.leqec 
"consent" had been obtai n.ed# the officers exceeded the scope of an\-
a . i«'i in, 1 I I y n i 1. jjuj in 
exploKdliuri ui i .:*-,- i .iLidi illegality; Mr. Ham, after being placed 
under arrest., was not advised of iiis rights per Miranda before the 
8
 See, State v. Velasquez, G'U r.2d 254 (Utah 1983); and 
the standard language found ' "lause .• "•'. • :-:aa,s Probation 
Agi eement. 
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officers further interrogated him, which led to additional 
incriminating statements and evidence. (R.163-68). 
We cannot assume that the Miranda Court envisioned that law 
enforcement officials could simply ignore those procedural 
safeguards, then obtain incriminating statements and evidence under 
the guise that the evidence would have been found anyway or that 
simply giving the Miranda notice was, in and of itself, sufficient 
to dissipate any taint generated by any prior illegality. 
IV. THE EVENTUAL NOTICE OF MR. HAM'S RIGHTS PER MIRANDA DID 
NOT DISSIPATE THE TAINT OF THE INITIAL AND ONGOING 
ILLEGALITY PERPETRATED BY THE AGENTS IN CONDUCTING THEIR 
UNAUTHORIZED SEARCH OF MR. HAM'S RESIDENCE. 
The United States Supreme Court has consistently rejected the 
proposition that "a search unlawful at its inception may be 
validated by what it turns up."9 In other words, all evidence 
that would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of 
the authorities becomes "fruit of the poisonous tree" unless and 
until the authorities can establish that discovery of the evidence 
was not through exploitation of the illegality.10 As advanced by 
the Court, the appropriate question to consider is "whether, 
granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to 
which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of 
that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to 
be purged of the primary taint."11 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963). 
Id. at 488. 
Id. (Citing Maguire, Evidence of Guilt, 221 (1959). 
21 
I r- .; i 
Ham's residence wit-iout wait ant, reasonable suspicion, or tne 
voluntary and unambinuous consent ^ • p'^ Agents' conduct 
search through LU Lti< ;. Line K • . :;>;•: was transported :*• the Salt Lake 
County Jail was pure exploitation of t h,-- '. r-i* , - ' .-lalirv Th^re 
vv : pei ide. <• • > 
l a p s e : , • i m e froir. T -.e initial search througn the remaining events 
which v M <i even. her' -;f there being ^tt pmr-^ i no circumstance^ ^r 
gathering process rr >m the primary taint of the initial unlawful 
invasion 4 'i>u. . naiu ^ pnvi",i?.. 
Sp-c*—.^g generalIv a. „. the criminal trial context, the 
Supreme Court; the Calandra case described the breadth of the 
exclusionary —•]••-• as follows: 
In the usuai context of a criminal trial, the defendant 
is entitled to the suppression of, not only the evidence 
obtained through an unlawful search and seizure, but also 
any derivative use of that evidence. ~" prohibition of 
the exclusionary rule must reach sue:. _._iivative use if 
it is to fulfill its function oi: deterring police 
misconduct. . . . Our conclusion necessarily controls 
both the evidence seized during the course of an unlawful 
search and seizure and any question or evidence derived 
therefrom (the fruits of the unlawful search). The same 
considerations of logic and policy apply to both the 
fruits of an unlawful search and seizure and derivative 
use of that evidence, and we do not distinguish between 
them. 
414 . . _ • S. 
Under the particular circumstances -jf tc present case, all 
evi dence --c '• '•^" wl -rbc 
"fruits of the poisuhuuo lu-t-y and must be suppressed iiese 
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agents are experience Probation Officers and are well aware of 
their duties and obligations with regard to lawful searches and 
seizures. This Court cannot allow these agents to simply ignore 
constitutionally guaranteed rights simply because they unilaterally 
determined it was an appropriate thing to do at the time. 
CONCLUSION 
Under Article I, section 14 of Utah's Constitution, as well as 
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
citizens of this state and nation are protected against 
unreasonable intrusions by government entities into their privacy. 
Under both Utah and United States Supreme Court decisions, the 
protection afforded a probationer may be diminished, but it still 
requires, at a minimum, an articulable and identifiable suspicion 
of wrongdoing before one's privacy rights can be invaded. As 
phrased by the Utah courts, a "reasonable suspicion" is required 
before a search can be conducted of a probationer's private 
property. 
Agents of the Department of Corrections, conducting a routine 
home visit and having absolutely no suspicions whatsoever, notified 
Mr. Ham that they were going to do an alcohol search of Mr. Ham's 
residence and they were going to search his refrigerator. Inasmuch 
as Mr. Ham was on probation, and these agents were probation 
officers, it is reasonable to anticipate that Mr. Ham would not be 
in a position of telling the agents what they could and could not 
do. The agents did not ask, they notified and conducted. In fact, 
with reference to the freezer, they conducted without notification. 
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search of a closed, separ ate and totally independent container. As 
such dil evidence seized should be suppressed as "fruits of the 
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hYT'GARY/L. BE BELL 
Attorney for Appe 
Gordon Ray Ham 
*'i-> Mast 100 South 
. 1;; \ a k o ^  *"• TTt:.'ih 
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Defendant. : 
The dei^u^x*. ^ .* Motion to Suppress which was considered 
i: evidentiary hearing this 17th day of rJ - . 19 94 tie 
. ctllltJLi L
 f .Tuctl KZ u f -jtS 
resented r stant rv.uKtv A-torney Rutr MCCIOF • rourt 
also of Liu- defendant. Based upon the testimony, argument and 
briefs as filed, the Court renders this 
MEMORANDUM DECISION. 
The defendant Gordon h~ nrr^nt -' he 
i i II 
Lhe Third J u a i c i a J • : . . f:oui'. i:. <** i em, *• *- : •••x.-al 
abuse o f f ense . r - ' v t "^ho^ " - • nqentr * " * n»-~i^* on 
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be described as a routine "home visit" at the defendant's residence 
at 8625 South 150 West in Midvale, Utah. 
In the course of the visit, Scott McCullough said, "We need to 
look in the refrigerator for alcohol." Mr. McCullough's 
recollection is that the defendant stated, "Go ahead." Certainly 
there was no denial of permission by the defendant. Mr. McCullough 
and Mr. Hillam walked with the defendant into the kitchen. Mr. 
McCullough looked in the refrigerator and Mr. Hillam pulled the 
door open to a separate freezer. All of this was done in the 
presence of the defendant and without any apparent objection. 
Within the freezer was found two bottles of alcohol. Mr. Hillam 
pulled the bottles out of the freezer. Mr. McCullough advised the 
defendant that possession of the alcohol was a violation of the 
terms and conditions of his probation agreement, and asked him if 
he, Mr. Ham, would lead them through the rest of the residence so 
that they could conduct a routine, yet cursory "walk through" 
search of the residence. 
They were led downstairs where there was an ice chest in which 
was found 14 cans of beer on ice. Mr. Hillam asked how to turn the 
light on in one of the rooms downstairs. The defendant told him 
that he needed to simply tighten the bulb, which he did. In plain 
view therein, Mr. Hillam found a mirror covered with a white dust 
STATE V. HAM PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
residue, some razor blades, and some other items that could be used 
for snorting cocaine. The mirror was in plain sight. It was at 
this time that Mr. Hillam placed Mr. Ham under arrest and 
handcuffed him. Unfortunately, Mr. Hillam did not Mirandize Mr. 
Ham at that moment, but asked him other questions. One question 
led to some contraband "mushrooms," which were retrieved. Mr. 
Hillam then Mirandized Mr. Ham, and thereafter Mr. Ham agreed to 
speak, and told Mr. Hillam and Mr. McCullough about a locked trunk 
under the staircase, bolted to the floor, in which was found 
considerable cocaine contraband. 
The question in this case is whether the parole officers had 
a contractual right and/or a reasonable basis on which to conduct 
the search? 
In State v. Velasquez. 672 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1983), and 
thereafter in State v. Martinez. 811 P.2d 205 (Utah App. 1991) , the 
court stated that there must be a "reasonable suspicion" prior to 
requiring the obtaining of a warrant for a search. 
In this case, the "reasonable suspicion" as to the violation 
of Mr. Ham's probation occurred when alcohol was found in his 
freezer in the kitchen. The officers had the right through the 
probation agreement and through the permission given by Mr. Ham to 
search the refrigerator and by implication, an adjacent freezer 
search was appropriate. Thereafter the officers were led through 
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the home for a visual search of the remainder of the property. It 
was certainly appropriate for the officers to examine the ice chest 
in plain sight in the basement wherein they found the 14 cans of 
beer on ice. It was not until the cocaine residue and drug 
paraphernalia was found that the officers knew that there was 
evidence of serious independent criminal conduct beyond a violation 
of the alcohol provision of probation agreement. 
The Court finds that immediately after finding the evidence of 
cocaine in the darkened room and upon arrest, the Miranda warning 
should have been given. However, it was given shortly thereafter, 
and the only disclosure made between the time of the initial 
observation of cocaine and the giving of the Miranda warning, 
resulted in the disclosure by the defendant of the location of the 
contraband "mushrooms." 
The Court finds that all of the contraband in the home would 
reasonably have been discovered through an appropriate search, and 
is thus admissible, see Nix v. Williams. 467 U.S. 431, 104 S. Ct. 
2501, (1984). The initial walk through search was conducted in a 
non-intrusive way in all respects. The defendant voluntarily 
provided the officers with information as to both the "mushrooms" 
and the locked box of cocaine under the stairs. There can be no 
question as to the admissibility of the locked box of cocaine; and, 
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the cocaine residue, and other paraphernalia in the darkened room; 
but, in addition, the Court finds that the mushrooms would have 
been discovered in an appropriate search and are thus also 
admissible. 
The defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied as to each of the 
items of evidence. 
The State is asked to prepare Findings and an Order consistent 
with this Memorandum Decision, and the evidence as presented at the 
hearing. 
Dated this _day of November, 1994. 
DAVID S. Y O U N G 7 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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7) // COUNTY/CA$£ * 
agree to be directed and supervised by Agents of the Department of 
Corrections and to be accountable for my actions and copduct to the Department of Corrections and the Court, 
I further agree to abide by ail conditions of probation as ordered by the Court and set forth in this Agreement 
consistent with the laws of the State of Utah. I fully understand that Violation of this Agreement and/or any conditions 
thereof or any qew conviction for a crime may result \n action by the Court causing my probation to be revoked or my 
probation period to commence again, 
,
 v CONDITIONS OF PROBATION 
* r > 1, I shall report directly to my supervising agent in person by the 5th of each month m » i ulhu-wiatf U l iuuw. 
j{^ 2. I shall permit visits to my place of residence, my plac^ of employment oreteewhereas required by the Department 
of Corrections for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the conditions of probation. 
jpt 3. I shall establish a residence of record and shall reside at such residence in fact and on record and shall not 
change my place of residence without the knowledge of my ^ probation agerlt 
# # 4 . I shall not leave the State cf Utah without prior written authorization from the Department of Corrections. I agree 
and acknowledge that should I leave the State of Utah without prior written authorization from the Department of 
Corrections, that I hereby waive extradition proceedings from any jurisdiction in which i may be found. 
A$ 5. I shall obey all state and federal laws and municipal ordinances at all times. I shall report any arrests or citations to 
the Department of Corrections within 72 hours of occurrence. 
4if^ I shall not own, possess, or have under my control or in my custody any explosives, firearms, or any dangerous 
weaopns in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 921T et sfeq.; 18 U.S-C. App. § 1201,et seq. or Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501. as amended. 
JJr7. I shall abstain from the illegal use, possession, control, delivery, production, manufacture or distribution of 
marijuana, narcotics* controlled substances or other drugs as defined in the Controlled ^ubstance Act, Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-2, as amended. I agree to submit to prinalysis or other tests for marijuana, narcotics, controlled substances or other 
drugs upon reasonably suspicion as ascertained by and at the request of a probation agent of the Department of 
Corrections to ensure compiianqe with this condition of probation. 
' . JPFB. f agree to allow an agent of the Department of Corrections to search my person, residence, vehicle or any other 
property under my control, without^ warrant any time d iy or night upo,n reasonable suspicion as ascertained by an agent 
of the Department of Corrections Ho ensure compliance with the conditions of probation. 
Mk 9. I shall not associate with any known Criminal in any manner which can reasonably be expected to result in, or 
which has resulted in criminal or illegal activity. 
M l O . I sha lLsaakHat ta iMt^^ , 
$ T 1 1 , I shdtl, comply witji the following special conditions^as'orderecf by the Court . / 
mm 
I have ri 
Agreement. 
Dated this. 
7 f:oow. .'3*9lWj-~?St^ T-
ad. understand and agree to the abov 
£fl£u- ^Tj/SOUf G/IAUATL SIM 
fr*Qfc 
conditions and I hereby acknowledge receipt of a copy of this 
??' . day of. •kj>j^A 19 ,9^> 
v il.A.JJU,* & 'trfi-Z n 
